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Fair value accounting and fi nancial stability
Market prices give timely signals that can aid decision making. However, in the presence of distorted 
incentives and illiquid markets, there are other less benign effects that inject artifi cial volatility to prices that 
distorts real decisions. In a world of marking-to-market, asset price changes show up immediately on the 
balance sheets of fi nancial intermediaries and elicit responses from them. Banks and other intermediaries 
have always responded to changes in economic environment, but marking-to-market sharpens and 
synchronises their responses, adding impetus to the feedback effects in fi nancial markets. 
For junior assets trading in liquid markets (such as traded stocks), marking-to-market is superior to historical 
cost in terms of the trade-offs. But for senior, long-lived and illiquid assets and liabilities (such as bank 
loans and insurance liabilities), the harm caused by distortions can outweigh the benefi ts. We review the 
competing effects and weigh the arguments.
HARESH SAPRA
Associate Professor of Accounting
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
GUILLAUME PLANTIN






Guillaume Plantin, Haresh Sapra and Hyun Song Shin: “Fair value accounting and fi nancial stability”
86 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 12 – Valuation and fi nancial stability • October 2008
Accounting is sometimes seen just as a veil leaving the economic fundamentals unaffected. Indeed, in the context of 
completely frictionless markets, where assets trade 
in fully liquid markets and there are no problems of 
perverse incentives, accounting would be irrelevant 
since reliable market prices would be readily available 
to all. Just as accounting is irrelevant in such a world, 
so would any talk of establishing and enforcing 
accounting standards. To state the proposition the 
other way round, accounting is relevant only because 
we live in an imperfect world, where markets are not 
always fully liquid and incentives may be distorted. 
In such an imperfect world, transaction prices may 
not be readily available. Even those prices that are 
available may not correspond to the hypothetical 
market prices that would prevail in frictionless 
perfect markets. Therefore, when we debate issues 
regarding accounting, it is important to be clear on 
the nature and consequences of the imperfections. 
Equally important in any debate in accounting is to 
be clear on the ultimate objectives of the accounting 
regime. What is the purpose of accounting standards? 
Whom should they serve? Should they serve the 
interests of equity investors? Should they serve the 
interests of a wider class of investors? Or, should 
we look beyond investors per se to the wider public 
interest, as for any other public policy issue?
Of course, in practice we may expect wide overlaps 
between the interests of equity investors, creditors 
and the wider public interest. However, the 
distinctions are important in principle, especially 
where the issues are complex and where our intuitions 
meet an unfamiliar landscape. In a recent paper,1 
we have provided a formal modeling framework to 
assess the various issues at stake in the move toward 
a “fair value” or “mark-to-market” reporting system in 
which market prices are employed in valuations as 
much as possible.2 The purpose of this contribution 
to the Financial Stability Review of the Banque de 
France is to place our earlier paper in the wider 
context of the debate on fi nancial stability, and to 
provide a review of the arguments for and against 
fair value accounting in this context.
Proponents of marking-to-market argue that the 
market value of an asset or liability is more relevant 
than the historical cost at which it was purchased 
or incurred because the market value refl ects the 
amount at which that asset or liability could be 
bought or sold in a current transaction between 
willing parties. A measurement system that refl ects 
the transactions prices would therefore lead to better 
insights into the risk profi le of fi rms currently in 
place so that investors could exercise better market 
discipline and corrective action on fi rm’s decisions.
The accounting scandals of recent years have further 
strengthened the hands of the proponents of fair value 
accounting. By shining a bright light into dark corners 
of a fi rm’s accounts, fair value accounting precludes 
the dubious practices of managers in hiding the 
consequences of their actions from the eyes of outside 
observers. Good corporate governance and fair value 
accounting are seen as two sides of the same coin.
The US Savings and Loan crisis is a case often cited 
in this context (see, for instance, Michael –2004). 
The crisis stemmed in part from the fact that the 
(variable) interest rates on the S&Ls’ deposit liabilities 
rose above the (fi xed) rates earned on their mortgage 
assets. Traditional historical cost accounting masked 
the problem by allowing it only to show up gradually 
through negative annual net interest income. The 
insolvency of many S&Ls became clear eventually, 
but a fair value approach would arguably have 
highlighted the problem much earlier, and have 
allowed the resolution of the problem at lower fi scal 
cost. Similarly, the protracted problems faced by the 
Japanese banking system in the 1990s are also cited 
as a case where slow recognition of losses on the 
banks’ balance sheet exacerbated the problems.
A pre-condition for the application of fair value 
accounting is that market values are available for 
the assets or liabilities in question. However, for 
many important classes of assets or liabilities, 
the prices at which transactions take place do not 
match up well to the ideal of the hypothetical 
frictionless competitive market. Loans are a good 
example. Loans are not standardised, and do not 
trade in deep and liquid markets. Instead, they are 
typical of many types of assets that trade primarily 
through the over-the-counter (OTC) market, where 
prices are determined via bilateral bargaining and 
matching. Loans are also packaged and tranched into 
asset backed securities such as collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs). However, such transactions also 
1 See Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008).
2 A (small) selection of literature debating the issue includes Volcker (2001), Herz (2003), Hansen (2004), European Central Bank (2004). See also industry studies, 
such as the joint international working group of banking associations (JWGBA, 1999), and the Geneva Association (2004).
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take place in OTC markets. Thus, fi nding the “fair 
value” of a loan or securitised asset is an exercise 
in fi nding the hypothetical price that would prevail 
were frictionless markets to exist for such assets. 
Hypothetical prices can be inferred from discount 
rates implied by transactions prices of related 
securities, but OTC markets do not conform to the 
ideal of deep and liquid markets of the frictionless 
economy. OTC markets are often illiquid, displaying 
time varying risk premia that depend sensitively 
on supply shocks. They exhibit low “resiliency” in 
the sense that transactions prices jump after large 
supply shocks, with prices recovering only slowly 
after the shock, consistent with slow absorption of 
the new supply by investors and intermediaries.
The key to the debate is whether fair value accounting 
injects excessive volatility into transactions prices 
–i.e. whether marking-to-market leads to the 
emergence of an additional, endogenous source 
of volatility that is purely a consequence of the 
accounting norm, rather than something that refl ects 
the underlying fundamentals. Real decisions would 
then distorted due to the measurement regime.
1| LESSONS FROM 
 THE MILLENNIUM BRIDGE
A good way to highlight the relevant questions is to 
take an example from outside the world of fi nance, by 
drawing on the lessons from the Millennium Bridge 
in London. Some readers may wonder why a bridge 
is relevant for accounting policy, but the case of 
the Millennium Bridge offers a classic case study of 
exactly the sort of market failure that is at debate in 
accounting policy.3
Many readers will be familiar with the 
Millennium Bridge in London. As the name suggests, 
the bridge was part of the Millennium celebrations in 
the year 2000. It is a pedestrian bridge that used an 
innovative “lateral suspension” design, built without 
the tall supporting columns that are more familiar 
with other suspension bridges. The vision was of a 
“blade of light” across the Thames. The bridge was 
opened by the Queen on a sunny day in June 2000, 
and the press was there in force. Many thousands of 
people turned up to savour the occasion. However, 
within moments of the bridge’s opening, it began 
to shake violently. The shaking was so severe that 
many pedestrians clung on to the side-rails. The 
BBC’s news website has some interesting video news 
clips. The bridge was closed soon after its opening 
and was to remain closed for over 18 months.
When engineers used shaking machines to send 
vibrations through the bridge, they found that 
horizontal shaking at 1 hertz (that is, at one cycle per 
second) set off the wobble seen on the opening day. 
This was an important clue, since normal walking 
pace is around two strides per second, which means 
that we are on our left foot every second and on our 
right foot every second. And because our legs are 
slightly apart, our body sways from side to side when 
we walk. Readers who have ever been on a rope bridge 
will need no convincing from us on this score.
But why should this be a problem? We all know that 
soldiers should break step before they cross a bridge. 
The pedestrians on the bridge were not soldiers. In any 
case, for thousands of pedestrians walking at random, 
one person’s sway to the left should be cancelled 
out by another’s sway to the right. If anything, the 
principle of diversifi cation suggests that having many 
people on the bridge is the best way of cancelling out 
the sideways forces on the bridge.
Or, to put it another way, what is the probability that 
a thousand people walking at random will end up 
walking exactly in step, and remain in lock-step 
thereafter? It is tempting to say “close to zero”. After 
all, if each person’s step is an independent event, 
then the probability of everyone walking in step 
would be the product of many small numbers –giving 
us a probability close to zero.
However, we have to take into account the way 
that people react to their environment. Pedestrians 
on the bridge react to how the bridge is moving. 
When the bridge moves from under your feet, it is 
a natural reaction to adjust your stance to regain 
balance. But here is the catch. When the bridge 
moves, everyone adjusts his or her stance at the 
same time. This synchronised movement pushes the 
bridge that the people are standing on, and makes 
the bridge move even more. This, in turn, makes the 
people adjust their stance more drastically, and so 
on. In other words, the wobble of the bridge feeds on 
itself. When the bridge wobbles, everyone adjusts his 
3 We draw on the discussion in Danielsson and Shin (2003), who used the Millennium Bridge analogy to discuss a wider range of issues in fi nancial stability.
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or her stance, which makes the wobble even worse. 
So, the wobble will continue and get stronger even 
though the initial shock (say, a small gust of wind) 
has long passed.
What does all this have to do with accounting 
standards and fi nancial markets? Financial markets 
are the supreme example of an environment where 
individuals react to what’s happening around 
them, and where individuals’ actions affect the 
outcomes themselves. The pedestrians on the 
Millennium Bridge are rather like modern banks 
that react to price changes, and the movements in 
the bridge itself are rather like price changes in the 
market. So, under the right conditions, price changes 
will elicit reactions from the banks, which move 
prices, which elicit further reactions, and so on.
Financial development has meant that banks 
and other fi nancial institutions are now at the 
cutting edge of price-sensitive incentive schemes 
and price-sensitive risk-management systems. 
Mark-to-market accounting ensures that any price 
change shows up immediately on the balance sheet. 
So, when the bridge moves, banks adjust their stance 
more than they used to, and marking-to-market 







The Millennium Bridge example points to the 
importance of the dual role of prices. Not only 
are they a refl ection of the underlying economic 
fundamentals, they are also an imperative to 
action. Prices induce actions on the part of the 
economic agents, as well as mirror the actions of 
the economic agents.
It is important here to distinguish volatility of prices 
that merely refl ect the volatility of the underlying 
fundamentals from volatility that cannot be justifi ed 
by these fundamentals. If the fundamentals 
themselves are volatile, then market prices will 
merely refl ect the underlying reality. However, 
the “artifi cial” nature of the volatility refers to 
something more pernicious. When the decision 
horizon of market participants is shortened due to 
short-term incentives, binding constraints or 
other market imperfections, then short term price 
fl uctuations affect the interests of these market 
participants, and hence will infl uence their actions. 
There is then the possibility of a feedback loop where 
anticipation of short-term price movements will 
induce market participants to act in such as a way 
as to amplify these price movements. When such 
feedback effects are strong, then banks’ decisions 
are based on the second-guessing of others’ decisions 
rather than on the basis of perceived fundamentals. 
In this sense, there is the danger of the emergence 
of an additional, endogenous source of volatility that 
is purely a consequence of the accounting norm, 
rather than something that refl ects the underlying 
fundamentals. Understanding the nature and 
severity of such effects is the key to appreciating 
the nature of the controversy surrounding the fair 
value reporting standards.
2| HISTORICAL COST VERSUS 
 MARKING-TO-MARKET
Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008) develop a parsimonious 
model that compares the economic effects of the 
historical cost and mark-to-market measurement 
regimes. The fundamental trade-off can be described 
as follows. The historical cost regime relies on past 
transaction prices, and so accounting values are 
insensitive to more recent price signals. This lack 
of sensitivity to price signals induces ineffi cient 
decisions because the measurement regime does 
not refl ect the most recent fundamental value of 
the assets.
Marking-to-market overcomes this price distortion 
by extracting the information conveyed by market 
prices, but in doing so, it also distorts this information. 
The choice is between relying on obsolete information 
or the distorted version of current information. The 
ideal of having an undistorted, true picture of the 
fundamentals is unattainable.
Under the historical cost regime, shortsighted fi rms fi nd 
it optimal to sell assets that have recently appreciated 
in value, since booking them at historical cost 
understates their worth. Despite a possible discount 
in the secondary market, the inertia in accounting 
values gives these short horizon fi rms the incentives 
to sell. Thus, when asset values have appreciated, the 
historical cost regime leads to ineffi cient sales.
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A remedy to the ineffi ciency in the historical cost 
regime would be to shift to a mark-to-market regime 
where asset values are recorded at their current 
transaction prices. This is only an imperfect solution, 
however. When markets are only imperfectly liquid 
in the sense that sales or purchases affect the short 
term price dynamics, the illiquidity of the secondary 
market causes another type of ineffi ciency. A bad 
outcome for the asset will depress fundamental 
values somewhat, but the more pernicious effect 
comes from the negative externalities generated by 
other fi rms selling. Under a mark-to-market regime, 
the value of my assets depends on the prices at 
which others have managed to sell their assets. When 
others sell, observed transaction prices are depressed 
more than is justifi ed by the fundamentals, and 
exerts a negative effect on all others, but especially 
on those who have chosen to hold on to the asset. 
Anticipating this negative outcome, a short-horizon 
bank will be tempted to preempt the fall in price by 
selling the asset itself. However, such preemptive 
action will merely serve to amplify the price fall. 
In this way, the mark-to-market regime generates 
endogenous volatility of prices that impedes the 
resource allocation role of prices.
In general, marking-to-market tends to amplify 
the movements in asset prices relative to their 
fundamental values, while the historical cost regime 
injects excessive conservatism. The mark-to-market 
regime leads to ineffi cient sales in bad times, but the 
historical cost regime turns out to be particularly 
ineffi cient in good times. The seniority of the asset’s 
payoff (which determines the concavity of the payoff 
function) and the skewness of the distribution of the 
future cash fl ows have an important impact on the 
choice of the optimal regime.
These effects lead to clear economic trade-offs 
between the two measurement regimes. In particular, 
the model of Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008) generates 
the following three main implications:
• For suffi ciently short-lived assets, marking-to-market 
induces lower ineffi ciencies than historical cost 
accounting. The converse is true for suffi ciently 
long-lived assets.
• For suffi ciently liquid assets, marking-to-market 
induces lower ineffi ciencies than historical cost 
accounting. The converse is true for suffi ciently 
illiquid assets.
• For suffi ciently junior assets, marking-to-market 
induces lower ineffi ciencies than historical cost 
accounting. The converse is true for suffi ciently 
senior assets.
These results shed some light on the political 
economy of accounting policy. The opposition to 
marking-to-market has been led by the banking and 
insurance industries, while the equity investors 
have been the most enthusiastic proponents for 
marking-to-market. For banks and insurance 
companies, a large proportion of their balance sheet 
consists precisely of items that are of long duration, 
senior, and illiquid. For banks, these items appear 
on the asset side of their balance sheets. Loans, 
typically, are senior, long-term, and very illiquid. For 
insurance companies, the focus is on the liabilities 
side of their balance sheet. Insurance liabilities are 
long-term, illiquid and have limited upside from 
the point of view of the insurance company. In 
contrast, equity is a class of assets that are junior, 
and (in the case of marketed equity) traded in 
liquid stock markets. For investors in such assets, 
marking-to-market tends to be superior. This 
observation helps to explain why equity investors 
have been the most enthusiastic supporters of 
marking-to-market.
The model also highlights the interplay between 
liquidity and the measurement regime. As the 
liquidity of the asset dries up, marking-to-market 
becomes signifi cantly more ineffi cient than the 
historical cost regime because strategic concerns 
overwhelm fundamental analysis. Strategic concerns 
create procyclical trades that destabilise prices in the 
mark-to-market regime while strategic concerns result 
in countercyclical trades that reduce fundamental 
volatility in the historical cost regime.
3| AMPLIFICATION “ON THE WAY UP”
So far, we have focused on ineffi cient sales and 
distortions that occur during periods of market 
distress. However, it would be important to keep 
in mind that crises are invariably preceded by a 
period of excess in the fi nancial markets. Although 
the clamor for the suspension of marking-to-market 
is most vocal during periods of market distress, it 
should be borne in mind that most of the excesses 
that are being unwound during crises were built up 
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during the preceding boom period. In short, it is 
important to identify the distortions “on the way up”, 
as well as the distortions “on the way down”.
Financial institutions manage their balance sheets 
actively in response to price changes and to changes 
in measured risk. Since market-wide events are felt 
simultaneously by all market participants, the reactions 
to such events are synchronised. If such synchronised 
reactions lead to rises in asset prices and subdued 
readings on measured risk, there is the potential for 
a further round of synchronised reactions. Financial 
intermediaries –the broker dealers and commercial 
banks– have balance sheets that are leveraged and 
hence whose net worth is most sensitive to price 
changes and shifts in measured risk.
Adrian and Shin (2007) show that fi nancial 
intermediaries react in a very different way as 
compared to households to shifts in prices and risk. 
Households tend not to adjust their balance sheets 
drastically to changes in asset prices. In aggregate 
fl ow of funds data for the household sector in the 
United States, leverage falls when total assets rise. In 
other words, for households, the change in leverage 
and change in balance sheet size are negatively 
related. However, for security dealers and brokers 
(including the major investment banks), there is a 
positive relationship between changes in leverage 
and changes in balance sheet size. Far from being 
passive, fi nancial intermediaries adjust their balance 
sheets actively and do so in such a way that leverage 
is high during booms and low during busts. Leverage 
is procyclical in this sense.
The accounting regime affects the degree to which 
such procyclical actions led to amplifi cation of 
the fi nancial cycle. When balance sheets are 
marked-to-market continuously, changes in asset 
values show up immediately as increases in the 
marked-to-market equity of the fi nancial institution, 
and elicit responses from them. Consider the 
following simple example, taken from Adrian and 
Shin (2008). A fi nancial intermediary manages its 
balance sheet actively to as to maintain a constant 
leverage ratio of 10. Suppose the initial balance sheet 
is as follows. The fi nancial intermediary holds 100 
worth of assets (securities, for simplicity) and has 
funded this holding with debt worth 90.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 100 Equity 10
Debt 90
Assume that the price of debt is approximately 
constant for small changes in total assets. Suppose 
the price of securities increases by 1% to 101.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 101 Equity 11
Debt 90
Leverage then falls to 101/11 = 9.18. If the bank 
targets leverage of 10, then it must take on additional 
debt worth 9, and with the proceeds purchases 
securities worth 9. Thus, an increase in the price 
of the security of 1 leads to an increased holding 
worth 9. The demand curve is upward-sloping. After 
the purchase, leverage is back up to 10.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 110 Equity 11
Debt 99
The mechanism works in reverse, on the way 
down. Suppose there is shock to the securities price 
so that the value of security holdings falls to 109. 
On the liabilities side, it is equity that bears the 
burden of adjustment, since the value of debt stays 
approximately constant.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 109 Equity 10
Debt 99
Leverage is now too high (109/10 = 10.9). The bank 
can adjust down its leverage by selling securities 
worth 9, and paying down 9 worth of debt. Thus, 
a fall in the price of securities of leads to sales of 
securities. The supply curve is downward-sloping. 
The new balance sheet then looks as follows.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 100 Equity 10
Debt 90
The balance sheet is now back to where it started 
before the price changes. Leverage is back down 
to the target level of 10. Leverage targeting entails 
upward-sloping demands and downward-sloping 
supplies. The perverse nature of the demand and 
supply curves are even stronger when the leverage 
of the fi nancial intermediary is pro-cyclical –that is, 
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when leverage is high during booms and low during 
busts. When the securities price goes up, the upward 
adjustment of leverage entails purchases of securities 
that are even larger than that for the case of constant 
leverage. If, in addition, there is the possibility of 
feedback, then the adjustment of leverage and price 
changes will reinforce each other in an amplifi cation 











If we hypothesise that greater demand for the asset 
tends to put upward pressure on its price, then there 
is the potential for a feedback effect in which stronger 
balance sheets (B/S) feed greater demand for the 
asset, which in turn raises the asset’s price and lead 
to stronger balance sheets. The mechanism works 
exactly in reverse in downturns. If we hypothesise 
that greater supply of the asset tends to put downward 
pressure on its price, then there is the potential for a 
feedback effect in which weaker balance sheets lead to 
greater sales of the asset, which depresses the asset’s 
price and lead to even weaker balance sheets.
Bearing in mind the amplifi cation mechanism 
sketched above, consider the following passage from 
a commentary published in the Wall Street Journal 
in 2005.4
“While many believe that irresponsible borrowing is 
creating a bubble in housing, this is not necessarily 
true. At the end of 2004, US households owned 
USD 17.2 trillion in housing assets, an increase of 18.1% 
(or USD 2.6 trillion) from the third quarter of 2003. Over 
the same fi ve quarters, mortgage debt (including home 
equity lines) rose USD 1.1 trillion to USD 7.5 trillion. 
The result: a USD 1.5 trillion increase in net housing 
equity over the past 15 months.”
The author minimises the dangers from the 
USD 1.1 trillion increase in debt by appealing to 
the marked-to-market value of housing equity. 
The argument is that when the whole US housing 
stock is valued at the current marginal transactions 
price, the increased marked-to-market equity is 
USD 1.5 trillion. This increased housing equity is 
seen as an argument against the view that increased 
debt is leading to an overheating housing market.
If the purpose of the exercise is to assess the 
soundness of the aggregate household sector balance 
sheet, then the marked-to-market value of the total 
US housing stock (assessed at the current marginal 
transaction price) may not be a good indicator of the 
soundness of the aggregate balance sheet. Instead, 
it would be better to ask how much value can be 
realised if a substantial proportion of the housing 
stock were to be put up for sale. The value realised 
in such a sale would be much smaller than the 
current marked-to-market value. This is one instance 
in which marking-to-market gives a misleading 
indicator of the aggregate position.
There is a larger issue. For leveraged fi nancial 
institutions, the increased marked-to-market equity
that results from a boom in asset prices leads to a 
feedback effect as they attempt to expand lending 
in order to keep leverage high enough to sustain an 
acceptable return on equity. The reasoning captured 
in the  Wall Street Journal commentary above would be
innocuous if fi nancial intermediaries did not react to 
changes in their marked-to-market equity. However, 
the fact is that fi nancial intermediaries do react to 
market prices. It is this reaction, and the subsequent 
feedback effect that leads to the excesses on the way 
up. Understanding the Millennium Bridge analogy 
is therefore crucial for understanding the role of 
measurement systems in promoting fi nancial stability.
4| POLICY OPTIONS
The choice of an accounting measurement 
regime for fi nancial institutions is one of the most 
contentious policy issues facing fi nancial regulators 
and accounting standard setters at the moment. 
4 “Mr. Greenspan’s cappuccino”, Commentary by Brian S. Wesbury, Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2005. The title makes reference to Alan Greenspan’s comments 
on the “froth” in the US housing market.
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Measurement policies affect fi rms’ actions, and these 
actions, in turn, affect prices. We have compared a 
measurement regime based on past prices (historical 
cost) with a regime based upon current prices 
(mark-to-market). The historical cost regime is 
ineffi cient because it ignores price signals. However, 
in trying to extract the informational content of 
current prices, the mark-to-market regime distorts 
this content by adding an extra, non-fundamental 
component to price fl uctuations. As a result, the 
choice between these measurement regimes boils 
down to a dilemma between ignoring price signals, 
or relying on their degraded versions.
Even under the historical cost regime, the accounting 
measurement for a long-lived asset is based on a 
historical cost with an impairment measurement 
regime. Namely, if the fair value of a long-lived 
asset is below its recorded cost, it is written down 
toward its fair value. Under a historical cost with 
impairment regime, our reasoning would predict that 
the ineffi ciencies of such a regime would depend on 
the nature of the impairment of the asset. This is 
because the nature of the impairment determines 
how the fair value of the long-lived impaired asset is 
computed. In particular, suppose the impairment of 
a loan is due to increased market risk so that the fair 
value of the long-lived loan is derived using stochastic 
discount rates obtained from recent transactions of 
comparable loans. In such a scenario, our reasoning 
would predict that such a measurement regime 
would be plagued with the same ineffi ciencies in the 
left tail of fundamentals as the ineffi ciencies in the 
left tail of fundamentals in a mark-to-market regime. 
Given that the ineffi ciencies in the right hand tail of 
fundamentals would still persist, our model would 
then imply that a historical cost with impairment 
regime would be unambiguously worse than a 
mark-to-market regime. On the other hand, suppose 
impairment of the loan is due to the deterioration of 
the credit risk of a specifi c borrower so that the fair 
value of such a loan would be derived using a discount 
rate specifi c to the borrower rather than relying on 
discount rates of other similar transactions. In such 
a scenario, our model would imply that the strategic 
effect associated with the lower tail of fundamentals 
in the mark-to-market regime may be weaker or may 
not even arise at all. Given that the ineffi ciencies in 
the right hand tail of fundamentals would still persist, 
our reasoning would predict that the ineffi ciencies 
in a historical cost with impairment would then 
be qualitatively similar to the ineffi ciencies in a 
historical cost regime without impairment.
So far, we have only discussed a “pure” historical cost 
regime, in which the price of an asset or liability is 
kept constant over time. Our analysis has emphasised 
the respective weaknesses of pure historical cost 
and mark-to-market regimes. However, it opens the 
door to a more general analysis of the normative 
implications for the design of an optimal standard. 
For instance, a measurement regime in which the 
accounting value of an asset is the average over 
some interval of time would allow market prices to 
fully exert themselves over the medium term, but 
prevent the short-run dynamics that lead to distorted 
decisions. A measurement regime for illiquid assets 
that discount future cash fl ows with discount factors 
that are an average of past observed discount factors 
may have desirable properties. In doing so, managers 
would be confi dent that fi re sales by other fi rms would 
have a limited impact on the end-of-period valuation 
of their assets. This procedure may remove to a 
large extent the risk of self-fulfi lling liquidity shocks 
that we have emphasised, while also mitigating the 
absence of price signals in a historical cost regime.
From a system stability perspective, inducing 
actions that dampen fi nancial cycles are to be 
desired. Although historical cost accounting has 
the limitation that recent prices are not taken into 
account, it does have the virtue that it induces 
actions that dampen the fi nancial cycle. When the 
market price of an asset rises above the historical 
cost of the asset, the manager of the fi rm has the 
incentive to sell the asset, in order to realise the 
capital gain. In other words, when the price rises, the 
incentive is to sell. Contrast this with the amplifying 
response of a market-to-market regime. As we saw 
above, when balance sheets are marked-to-market, 
an increase in the price of assets leads to purchases 
of the asset. In other words, when the price rises, 
the incentive is to buy more. It is this amplifying 
response of marking-to-market that is at the heart 
of the debate.
Our discussion suggests that the full implementation 
of a mark-to-market regime may need considerable 
investigation and care. We would emphasise 
the importance of the second-best perspective 
in accounting debates. When there are multiple 
imperfections in the world, removing a (strict) 
subset of them need not always improve welfare.
We close with some remarks on governance issues. 
The accounting standard setters –the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the 
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US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)– 
do not see it as part of their remit to consider the 
overall economic impact of accounting standards. 
Instead, they see their role in much narrower terms, 
of ensuring that accounting values refl ect current 
terms of trade between willing parties. However, 
we have seen that accounting standards have 
far-reaching consequences for the working of fi nancial 
markets, and for the amplifi cation of fi nancial 
cycles. To the extent that accounting standards 
have such far-reaching impact, the constituency 
that is affected by the accounting standard setters 
may be much broader than the constituency that 
the accounting standard setters have in mind when 
setting standards. This raises an obvious question. 
Is accounting too important to be left solely to the 
accountants? It is diffi cult to escape the conclusion 
that the answer to this important question is “yes”. 
Accounting has all the attributes of an area of public 
policy, intimately linked to fi nancial regulation and 
the conduct of macroeconomic policy. As such, 
there may be strong arguments for ensuring that 
accounting rules play their role in the overall public 
policy response.
Our paper has attempted to shed light on how the 
second-best perspective can be brought to bear on 
the debate on optimal accounting standards, and to 
provide a framework of analysis that can weigh up 
the arguments on both sides. Issues of measurement 
have a far-reaching infl uence on the behaviour of 
fi nancial institutions, and determine to a large extent 
the effi ciency of the price mechanism in guiding 
real decisions.
Accounting would be irrelevant in a perfect world. 
The fact that accounting is so controversial shows us 
that we live in an imperfect world. Our task has 
been to show how the nature of those imperfections 
speaks to the appropriate policy responses.
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